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counteraction policy   
Research question: 
The worrying level of dependence on natural gas imports from sources outside the 
European Union (EU) is becoming more obvious, against the background of own reserves 
depletion. According to the EIA (US Energy Information Administration) and IEA (International 
Energy Agency), between now and 2020, the EU will need to develop additional natural gas 
supplies of approximately 120-150 Gcm/a
1
. As of 2009 Europe has obtained approximately 47% 




 Gazprom, presently controlling more than 85% of Russian natural gas production and has 
a monopoly on the natural gas export, is the largest exporter of natural gas to Europe
3
. 
Dependence on Russian gas is distributed disproportionally among European countries. The most 
dependant countries are Bulgaria, Finland, Slovakia, Romania, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. 
The latter three imported 100% of their natural gas from Russia in previous years, while the 
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average dependence can be estimated as 40% of all EU imports in 2009 (Eurostat Database, 
OECD, Natural Gas Information 2009).
4
  
The strong desire of most of EU member states to diversify their gas imports is 
understandable, taking into account that disruption of gas supply from Russia can cause huge 
damage to the European economy, especially Eastern and South Eastern Europe.
5
 Since 2005, 
Poland, as the potential internal gas supplier, has been taking steps towards energy independence 
by granting 30 companies the license to search for gas on its own territory. Companies 
like Exxon Mobil, Conoco Phillips and Marathon have been studying the Polish terrain to assess 
how expensive it would be to access the country’s shale plays. Geologists estimate that there are 
approximately 1.4 billion cubic meters of untapped natural gas throughout the country. In 
addition, this month Poland called on the European Union to give more weight to the role of 
shale gas in its energy policy in order to cut the region’s dependence on imports. 
6
 
However, Russia has gas reserves of 48 trillion cubic meters (TCM), according to the 
Russian A+B+C1 classification.
7
 Gazprom estimates that it has 28 TCM of reserves in fields, in 
production or being prepared for development, compared to an international estimate of 18.5 
TCM of proven and probable reserves in those same fields.
8
 Whichever estimate is used, it is 
clear that Russian reserves overwhelm all other gas reserves available to Europe with the 
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exception of Middle Eastern countries, which are anticipated to deliver to Europe only in the 
form of LNG over the next two decades.
9
 
Russia's expansion strategy is focused on increasing of European dependence on Russian 
natural gas. The Kremlin has advanced this strategy through a series of policies. It creates 
dependency by locking in demand with energy importers, consolidating the supply of gas by 
signing long-term contracts with Central Asian energy producers, and securing control of 
strategic energy infrastructure in Europe and Eurasia or developing new one. The most vivid 
example here is Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines, which some of political experts call as 
tool for Russia to strengthen its influence the political process in EU countries in Eastern Europe. 
Particularly since the perceived threat of interrupting gas deliveries already provides Russia with 




It is clear here that Gazprom stays ahead of the expansion processes into EU natural gas 
market with 50.002 per cent of controlling stake in hands of the government. Therefore, activity 
of Gazprom acquires not just main principle of any economic unit as profitability, but also 
dependence on political ambitions of the state. For this reason, Gazprom’s expansion aspirations 
are running into increasing opposition led by fears of over-reliance on Russian gas and growing 
Russian influence not just on distribution networks in Europe, but also on EU political decision 
making process in general.  
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The supposed structure of the thesis : 
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The intended methodology of the thesis:  
The following methods are going to be implemented:   
1) Case study method (accompanied with the event analysis) which will help with providing 
a wide range of information and theoretical explanation concerning plans/aims of the 
pipelines construction; 
2) Data analyzing method which is useful for evaluation of descriptive statistical data 
(about the natural gas reserves, its production, consumption etc) and for presenting 
additional points to the arguments of the thesis; 
3) Method of comparative analysis, which on the basis of the results received after the 
previous methods applied, will help to produce a better perspective for the studied issues.  
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The worrying level of dependence on natural gas imports from sources outside the 
European Union (EU) is becoming more obvious, against the background of own reserves 
depletion. According to the EIA (US Energy Information Administration) and IEA (International 
Energy Agency), between now and 2020, the EU will need to develop additional natural gas 
supplies of approximately 120-150 Gcm/a. As of 2009 Europe has obtained approximately 47% 




Europe’s natural gas market shows heavy dependence on exporters outside the European 
Union (EU). Statistics show that Europe obtained forty-seven percent of its natural gas supplies 
from external sources in 2009.
12
 Taking into account that natural gas is not transportable, as it is 
required to be attached to the pipeline, it is a hardly replaceable source of energy. Thereby, the 
high dependency on one exporter can easily provoke dramatic economic downturn in case of any 
conflict, leading to the gas supply cut from the exporter’s side.  
But why Russia and especially Russian Gazprom are considered as undesirable parity at 
the position of Europe’s biggest gas supplier? At present, the leading source of natural gas 
imports to Europe is Gazprom - State-Controlled Natural Gas Monopoly. Gazprom produces 85 
percent of natural gas in Russia and has monopoly share in natural gas export to Europe. It also 
should be mentioned that for Russia, energy, as the major export earner, is the most powerful 
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non-military tool of economic and political pressure on International arena, good example here is 
the conflict with Ukraine and Belarus, which will be also brought up in this work.  
The goal of the master thesis is to answer the main questions: 1) Are European “fears” 
justified? 2) What are the perspectives for Europe to decrease its dependency on Russian natural 
gas export? In order to do that the following should be disclosed: 
- Defensive Realism Theory and Russian Energy Policy. The goal of this chapter is 
to provide with enough arguments to prove that Russia’s Energy Policy relies more on defensive 
realism theory than on any other International Relation Theories. That helps us to support the 
idea, that Russia, in a logical desire of security, is interested in expansion of its influence in 
energy sector, while Europe wants to protect itself against increasing dependence on Russia. 
Based on what we can conclude, that Russia as a state is motivated by gaining as much power as 
possible to be politically and economically secure. 
- Analysis of Natural Gas Market of Russia and Gazprom as the Russian quasi-gas-
monopoly. The goal of this chapter is to consider the capacity of Russian natural gas industry for 
aggressive international expansion and evaluate the role of the government in Gazprom’s 
decision making process. It is important to define how strong the connection between 
government and the company is; what affects Gazprom’s expansion strategy plans more: revenue 
generating desire as any of economic unit, or political aspirations of its host state.    
- Analysis of CIS countries Natural Gas Market [consideration Gazprom’s energy 
policy here as the part of expansion strategy into European markets]. The CIS natural gas 
market involves many states in the region. However, their consideration will be limited based on 






the parts of the European agenda towards Energy security. The reason is not only their 
substantial gas reserves, but also their geographical location, which provides an optimal way to 
link all parties to deliver the gas to European customers. The goal of this chapter is to evaluate 
current condition of the local markets of these countries, perspectives to cover Europe’s gas 
demand by them and Gazprom’s actions directed to prevent Europe’s presence on this market.  
- Analysis of Natural Gas Market of Europe.  The current condition of the 
European natural gas market should be disclosed in order to understand its dependence on this 
source of energy and dependence on Russia itself. However, the chapter is mainly dedicated to 
Gazprom’s expansion plans towards European market and Europe’s counteraction to them.   
- Competing Pipelines [Consideration of “South Stream” and “Nabucco” as the 
Main Competing Projects of Russia and Europe].  The South Stream and the Nabucco projects 
are the two largest competitors for the European Union natural gas supply industry. The case 
fully demonstrates competition of Russia and Europe, where Russia tries to increase its share on 
European market by creation additional supply infrastructure, while Europe looks for alternative 






LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
In order to disclose the main thesis questions a number of sources have been chosen, 
which are classified by primary and secondary sources. A primary source is a document or 
physical object which was written or created during the time under study. These sources were 
present during an experience or time period and offer an inside view of a particular event, while 
secondary source interprets and analyzes primary sources.
13
  
Firstly, to support the theoretical part of the thesis, assuming that Russian Foreign Policy 
(and as the result Russian Energy Policy towards external markets) is based on Defensive 
Realism Theory, the works of researches and authors of (neo) realism theory and political 
scientists specializing on Russia (such as John Berryman, Erik Jones, Colin Elman, Anita Orban, 
Robert Gilpin, Richard Sakwa, Kanet, R.E. and Homarac, L, Legro, J.W. and Moravcsik, A) are 
used. These works will help us to define the main assumptions of the theory and to find 
connections between them and Russian Foreign Policy - that provides us with enough arguments 
to support the idea that Russia, in a logical desire of security, is interested in expansion of its 
influence in energy sector as the primary one for Russia. Thereby, by reviewing connections 
between Russian government and Gazprom we can identify the level of politization of the 
company and its involvement in Russian Foreign Policy. For these goals we will analyze the 
opinions of Simon Pirani (the book: “Russian and CIS gas markets and their impact on Europe”), 
Rischard Sakwa (the book: “Putin and the Oligarchs”), Ross Cameron (the book: “Russian 
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Politics under Putin”) together with other analytical resources as New Political Economy and 
Eurasia Daily Monitor Journals, Guardian and RFE/RL news portals and others.    
    
Secondly, taking into account that the primary object of our research is Gazprom as the 
Russian state monopoly with the soul right on gas export, it is necessary to consider its positions 
on local and foreign markets and capacity for overseas expansion. In order to do that, statistical 
data will be used, which helps us to disclose the situation on the natural gas markets of the 
European Union, Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan by the end of 2009.  
Additionally, the level of Europe’s dependency on natural gas in general and on Russian gas in 
particular will be disclosed. The sources, from which such information will be extracted are 
British Petroleum official website, Eurostat, European Commission’s Directorate, Gazprom 
official website and many others, where British Petroleum official site is taken as the main one, 
since it is widely recognized as the most authoritative and reliable. The second reason, why 
British Petroleum was taken as the main one, is the necessity of data comparability. The fact that 
Gazprom uses different standard for the gas reserves evaluation, which takes into account only 
actual presence of natural gas in deposits, while international standards evaluate also the 
economic effectiveness from the reserves’ depletion. It makes it difficult to compare the data 
received from the different sources.  
Thirdly, as the main part of the thesis dedicated to Gazprom’s expansion plans towards 
European market and Europe’s counteraction to them, it will be built based on several authors’ 
researches and opinions as Steven Woehrel, Aleksandr Medvedev, Steven Brakman, Charles van 
Marrewijk, and Arjen van Witteloostuijin, Danila Bochkarev, Roman Kupchinsky, White, Aoife, 








In the conduction of this study the following research methods have been used: data 
analyzing, comparative analysis and the case study.   
The data analyzing method – the effective way of evaluation the natural gas markets 
condition of the represented counties as EU Member States, Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. Mainly, the following data is analyzed: the volume of proved 
natural gas reserves, the level of production and consumption, the volumes and destinations of 
exported and imported gas, consideration of gas transportation capacity and level of competition 
on local markets. To provide reader with clearer picture on considering subjects a number of 
graphs and charts will be used. 
The method of comparative analysis – directed more on demonstration advantages and 
disadvantages of the considered countries in comparison with each other – mainly applicable for 
the Russian Federation and EU-27. The method will also help to evaluate the countries’ natural 
gas producing level, importing and exporting potential and natural gas dependency rate. Using 
the method we can define the reason of growing dependence rate of Europe and role of Russia in 
EU’s energy sector, Russian expansion policy towards European market and Europe’s 
counteraction measures. 
In order to fully understand the process of “clash” of Russian and European interests the 
case study method will be used. The subject of consideration is two projects South Stream and 






European market, while second one is Europe’s attempt to find alternative to Russian gas. 
Defining the current situation, perspectives and expectations related to projects we can make 
conclusion on which country is more successful in its aspirations. 
 





CHAPTER 1. DEFENSIVE REALISM THEORY AND RUSSIAN ENERGY POLICY 
 
In modern form of international relationship, it is very difficult to understand the foreign 
policy of Russian Federation. Regardless of the challenges like integration and globalization, 
Russia is still deeply in the illusion of hegemony that was experienced during the cold war.
14
 
Despite the fact that Russia is the world’s biggest country with a capability to develop nuclear 
weapons, it still encounters some problems that are associated to political and economic 
transformation. In spite of that Russia has a great influence in international relations as it is 
viewed as one of the world’s major economic power. Such influence is more related to Russian’s 
domination in the global energy sector, while other its industries are relatively weak. Moreover, 
it can be called the main tool of Russia’s economic and political pressure.  
The goal of this chapter is to provide with enough arguments to prove that Russia’s Energy 
Policy relies more on defensive realism theory than on any other International Relation Theories. 
That helps us to support the argument that Russia in a logical desire of security is interested in 
expansion its influence in energy sector, while Europe wants to protect itself against increasing 
dependence on Russia. 
For the purpose of analyzing the Russian Energy Policy on the basis of defensive realism 
theory, it would be appropriate to consider the challenges that the country has faced as well as 
strategies it is employing to gain control of the energy sector. 
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1.1. Defensive Realism Theory and Russia. 
 
There is a very simple and realistic justification behind why states contest to gain more 
power. The justification is based on four simple assumptions related to international system. 
Looking at these assumptions individually, none of them suggest that states attempt to gain more 
power at other states’ expense.
15
 But indeed, when they are combined together, they illustrate a 
world of endless security rivalry that has prompted Russia to adopt defensive realism theory. The 
first assumption states that the individual or the actors, which have great powers, directs politics 
of the world and the system they work in is an anarchic system. This does not mean that there 
would be a disorder or chaos as anarchy is a kind of ordering principle. 
Anarchy is a system in which there would be no ultimate arbiter or any centralized authority 
that would be above the state. In addition, anarchy which is at times associated with hierarchy is 
also a kind of ordering principle that is related to domestic politics.
16
 Russia seems to be trying 
all that it can to gain control of its territories and extend this control to other nations in Europe 
without using excessive force to achieve this.   
Russian as a major supplier of gas and oil in the European market is considered to be quite 
influential in the energy sector.
17
 The Russian government strives to control the energy industry 
in Russia and the neighboring countries in the larger Europe. This has led to emergence of an 
authoritarian Russian political system, where the former officers who worked with the 
intelligence are said to play major roles.  
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It is well noted that Russian firms have of late done all that they can to purchase a big portion 
of pipelines, storage facilities, ports, together with other major energy assets associated with 
eastern and central Europe. The main reason for this move is so to be recognized as the major 
transport energy supplier in the western European markets, besides securing a greater control of 
the domestic markets within its region.
18
 Records show that in those cases where these energy 
assets were handed over to non-Russian firms, Russia went ahead to cut off energy supply to 
these facilities. Russia has also in several instances tried to build new pipelines that would avoid 
infrastructures not under its control. Russia has also tried to eliminate any energy subsidies that a  
former Soviet republics could have been controlling after the fall of the Soviet Union, mainly by 
raising the price of natural gas that these countries have to pay in comparison to the prices in the 
market.  
The second assumption is related to the military capabilities of Russia. As each state has its 
own potential, they can also negatively influence it neighbor. The capability may vary state to 
state and it many also change as time passes.
19
 Russia may have been losing grounds for the last 
few decades but it is employing all possible strategies to regain this control. Another reason 
(third assumption) is related to the uncertainty regarding the intentions of different states. 
Gaining knowledge related to different states that whether they are willing to use force to change 
balance of power, or they are pleased with the power they have and are not willing to use any 
force to change the balance Russia has held the argument that it can never be too sure of the 
states’ intention that they are aware of whether they are status quo state or revisionist one.  
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The fourth assumption employed by Russia and which they use to justify their adoption of 
defensive realism theory, is that a state’s ultimate objective is survival.
20
 A state is always keen 
to maintain territorial integrity and autonomy irrespective of domestic politics.  
  Russia defense experts hold that there are times when states act very rationally while at 
times they are capable of making different strategies that increase their chances of survival. But 
on the other hand, it is also true that the strategies are sometimes miscalculated due to inadequate 
information.
21
 In this world it is very difficult to obtain correct information and due to such 
information serious mistakes happen. This is one of the strongest factors that have prompted 
Russia to justify its energy policy that is based on defensive realism theory as opposed to the 
offensive approach.  
As mentioned above, none of the assumptions mention that states would compete among 
themselves for power. Indeed the third assumption mentions a revisionist state which acts 
aggressively for power although it is not elaborated why Russia is interested and prepared to 
fight for power. But when these assumptions are put together and combined, such condition 
arises where a state is not only preoccupied with balance of power but is also trying to acquire 
different incentives to increase its power even at the expense of other states. It is however true 
that great powers fear each other due to mistrust that arises among them. Studies have shown that 
the greatest fear among the states is that they have power, capability and even motives to attack 
one another.
22
 This has eventually led to anarchic system of operation where states are only 
concerned of their own security or external threats.  
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The degree of fear varies from state to state and remains significant at all times although 
the cost of letting this happen is quite high. International politics is very delicate and it has 
potential to initiate a war which could result in mass killings or total destruction of a state.
23
 
Russia wants to be recognized as a powerful state and they want to be in an environment where 
they do not need much of help from their neighbors. The only way of survival for them is to 
employ defensive tactics and hence the need to clearly adopt defensive realism theory. This is 
because other states remain to be threats to Russia and they do not know which among them they 
can contact when they are in trouble. This does not exclude the possibility of alliance as they are 
indeed useful while handling dangerous adversity. Ultimately, it comes to a point where Russia 
as a state has to put its own interests first leaving before considering the international 
community.  
In addition to fear of other states, also knowing that they live in a self-help world, Russia 
has realized that the only way to survive is to gain power. The reason behind gaining power is 
very simple as when a state is more powerful as compared to its competitors, there is also a less 
chance of attack. For example, no one in Western Hemisphere could try to attack USA because it 
is relatively more powerful than its neighbors.
24
  Russia wants to gain the same in Europe .This 
is the justification that drives Russia to find means that could shift the power in such a way that it 
is fruitful for them. This all results in a system that forces every state to act and think in a way 
that is more like revisionist state even if they could be classified as status quo.  
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1.2. Russia’s Energy Policy in Relation to the Concept of Defensive Realism Theory. 
 
 In an effort to dominate the energy sector and remain powerful in the control of this 
sector, the Russia’s energy policy is based on the principles of the defensive realism. To 
emphasize this, Russia does not advocate for the use of force while handling the international 
relations. Internal political preferences in many states around the world, and the distribution of 
power along the global system are based on defensive realism theory.
25
  The application of the 
defensive realism in Russia is based upon the realization of the need to remain economically 
independence.  
 The country has vowed to use all the available resources in an effort to protect her 
national interests. In order to achieve this objective the state has to continue in increasing the 
potential it has in the fuel and energy industry as means of boosting the economy.
26
 Moreover, 
Russia is concentrating in being rampant in the world market in relation to the supply of energy. 
The authorities in Russia understand that when there is uneven distribution of natural resources 
among countries, possession of energy resources will remain paramount in the international 
scene.  
 Russia as the world’s largest exporter and producer of energy uses the economic returns 
from the energy resources for the protection of the national security.
27
 The idea of possessing the 
energy resources is viewed as a lever for the promotion of foreign and energy policy. To reaffirm 
the importance of the Russia’s energy sector, Sergei Lavrov - Russia’s Minister of Foreign 
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Affairs, stated that energy was a strategic industry in Russia.
28
 Its supply to the rest of the world 
is a means of achieving independence in the foreign policy. This is however not taken lightly by 
many countries that continue criticizing Russia for the role it plays in the energy sector as they 
are generally unhappy with her dominance in this industry. The general application of the 
defensive realism was evident during the period of cold war. The international relations played a 
very helpful role in explaining and analyzing different nations and the leaders of the countries.
29
 
The structural attitudes were the main things that lead to high potential for assessing the order of 
bipolar approach in politics where offensive and defensive realism approaches were made to be 
part of the debate.  
Both realisms stated different ideas and views regarding the foreign policies and military 
of state. However, both of them relates to order of bipolar. The defensive realism supports the 
survival of state and it considers it as its main objective. Moreover, the present states that are the 
strongest should adopt a moderate policy, for the reason that the powers have not been achieved 
yet.
30
 On the other hand, offensive realism assumes that there are wide incentives and advantages 
through the international anarchy.
31
  However, this defensive realism theory has been widely 
influenced by the ineffectiveness of bipolar order and the decline of USSR.  
An example on the application of defensive realism in the Russia’s energy policy is the 
Russia-Ukraine gas dispute in January 2006. Russia had temporarily cut the gas supply to 
Ukraine. Most of the European states were opposed the Russia’s move but Moscow could not 
understand why Europe was siding with Ukraine which according to Moscow, was involved in 
                                                          
28 Kanet, R.E. and Homarac, L, “The US Challenge to Russian Influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus”, in: Kanet, R.E. 
(ed.), Russia Re-Emerging Great Power, (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 
pp.182-185 
29
 Gilpin R.,  “The Theory of Hegemonic War”, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Spring, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1988, 591-593 
30
 Orban, Anita 35 
31
 Legro, J.W. and Moravcsik, A.  “Is Anybody Still a Realist?”, International Security, Fall Vol. 24, No. 2, 1999, p.30 





the theft of Russian gas. Russia had closed the gas pipes leading to Ukraine although most of the 
European countries complained that Russia should not have taken such drastic move without 
thoroughly consulting the European consumers. The Russia’s behavior of trying to regulate the 
gas supply to the neighboring states was by then considered to be quite authoritative and anti-
democratic.
32
  The shutdown for the gas deliveries had lasted for just 24 hours bad had 
tremendous psychological consequences to the consumers. In 2007 Russia had an oil and gas 
dispute with Belarus concerning the prices of these commodities which actually resulted in a 
three day stoppage on delivery of oil and gas to Belarus. 
About 15 percent of all the oil consumed in the EU is from Russia while 30 per cent of all 
the EU oil imports are from Russia making Russia to be in a strategic powerful position in the 
energy sector. As Russia continues to apply defensive realism in energy policy, it had entered 
into a tall with the Iranian President in 2007 on the possibility of forming a gas cartel. Many 
European countries feared that such a cartel would lead to artificial shortages of gas supply in a 
bid to increase the market prices. There was a delegation from Russia that was sent to Algeria, 
which is the second largest supplier of gas to Europe, in 2007 to analyze the possibility of having 
a gas cartel. The view for the western countries was that Russia was becoming increasingly 
aggressive in using energy as a weapon against Europe by the attempt to create a gas OPEC. 
The main serious problem that was anticipated was fast but peaceful changes in the 
global order. Practically this contradicted with the predictions of Kenneth Waltz.
33
 The 
possibilities were regarding the disagreement of cataclysmic through which cold war would end. 
According to Erik Jones, the problems of structural realism that were faced were anticipated and 
he further pointed out that this realism could not consider internal determinants that broke up 
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Soviet Unions. It was further stated by Wolfforth that the decline of USSR was not entirely due 
to a decline in Soviet power but the decline of perception by Soviet elites was also one of the 
reason.  
The ability to explain and respond to the structural realism seemed to be very problematic 
especially due to the imposed policy by Russia and refusal of Moscow to accept a new place in 
the system. One could easily notice that there had been a clear objection from Moscow in 
accepting a new place.
34
  By observing their foreign activities one could figure out the role that it 
has planned to play internationally, especially the global aspirations of Russia and the lost 
position due to falling of USSR .Russia further acted in opposition to the policy of US after the 
ineffectiveness of bipolar order. Russia also criticized unipolar order that was introduced by 
Washington and rather a new system of multipolar was demanded that could reflect 
‘’legitimate’’ position of the federation of Russia. Similarly, the fierce opposition of Moscow 
towards the operation of NATO in the US and Kosovo had been a good example. It was 
perceived that the Russian objectives were fully ignored and Moscow was not allowed to take 
part in the affairs of the world.
35




The need to apply defensive realism in the Russia’s energy policy has been catalyzed by 
the emerging international competition for the Russia’s energy resources. If offensive realism is 
applied friction is likely to arise between Russia and the consumers. The international 
competition that takes place in Russia is of great significance especially in positioning Russia as 
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a world power without using military force. The  main focus of defensive realism theory 
employed by Russia is on the internal determinants such as political regimes, ideology or 
political leaders and this does not possibly reflect the foreign policy of Russian, along with the 
entire structure of international system. Russian policies have remained very complex in nature.  
Russia however enjoys the first position as the largest country but its economic capabilities have 
become very limited and there had been a decline in international position after the cold war 
ended. The policies of Moscow still include a tradition of central government as well as the 
dominant relationships with the neighboring countries. All of this demonstrates the centralization 
process in the political life of Russia but it has of late clearly adopted the approach supported by 
defensive realism theory to regain control as a superpower in Europe.  





CHAPTER 2. ANALYSIS OF NATURAL GAS MARKET OF RUSSIA AND GAZPROM AS 
THE RUSSIAN QUASI-GAS-MONOPOLY 
 
2.1. Natural Gas Market of Russia 
With nearly one fifth of worldwide production capacity, Russia is the world’s most important 
source of natural gas. At the current rate of production, its resources, the largest worldwide, will 
last for another 70 years.
36
 The cited internationally total proven Russian gas reserves as of the 
end of 2009 was 44.38 trillion cubic meters (Tcm).
37
  
In 2009 Russia was the world’s second-largest natural gas producer, ceding top place to the 
United States. The total Russian natural gas production in year 2009, excluding gas flared or 
recycled, was estimated at the level of 527.5 billion cubic meters (Bcm), 73.9% (389.7 Bcm) of 
which was delivered to the local customers.
38
 To follow the dynamics of Russian natural gas 
balance we can analyze the data of pre-crisis year 2007, with a 592.0 Bcm of total production, 
where already 71.3% (422.1 Bcm) was consumed locally. In comparison with pre-crisis year 
2007, negative dynamics of internal consumption, as a total volume of production, are observed 
in 2009, with 8% and 12% downturn.
39
  
Russian gas production was sustained for more than 20 years by three supergiant fields in the 
Nadym-Pur-Taz (NPT) region of Western Siberia (Medvezhe, Urengoi and Yamburg). These 
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The new generation of supergiant fields is represented by Ob and Taz Bay fields, the Yamal 
Peninsula fields and the Shtokman field in the Barents Sea. The Ob/Taz Bay fields are estimated 
to have a production potential of up to 82 Bcm/year.
41
 The reserves of the Yamal Peninsula are 
more than 10 Tcm, with the potential to take the Russian gas industry through the next several 
decades of its development.
42
 Bovanenkovo, the first of these Yamal fields, will start production 
in 2011. Output will increase within three years to 115 Bcm/year, and eventually, when a further 
25 Bcm/year is produced from the deeper horizons, to 140 Bcm/year.
43
 After Bovanenkovo 
reaches its initial production plateau in 2014, the Kharasavei field will be brought into 
production. Shtokman, around 1000 km west of Yamal Peninsula, and 650 km offshore 
Murmansk in the Barents Sea, is a supergiant field with 3.7 Tcm of reserves.
44
  
Natural gas produced in Russia is pumped into gas trunk lines integrated within the Russian 
Unified Gas Supply System (UGSS). The UGSS is also the largest gas transmission system in 
the world and represents a unique technological complex comprising gas extraction, processing, 
transmission, storage and distribution facilities UGSS assures a continuous cycle of gas supply 
from the wellhead to the end user.
45
 UGSS includes over 150,000 km of trunk gas pipelines (in 
single-line terms) and almost 6,000 km of bends. In addition, nearly 4,000 km of gas trunk lines 
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are outside the UGSS. The active underground gas storage capacity in Russia is over 60 Bcm. 
The throughput capacity of the gas transport system is about 700 Bcm/year.
46 
 
The gas industry is vital for to the Russian economy, accounting for more than half of all the 
energy consumed in the country and contributing 13% of total export revenues.
47
 While gas 
contribution is significantly less than of the oil industry, the later has no counterpart company, in 
terms of centrality and dominance, to Gazprom, the majority state-owned gas company which, 




Russian total gas exports in year 2009 estimated at 183.09 Bcm, 176.48 Bcm (96.4%) of it is 
pipeline exports and 6.61 Bcm (3.6%) is LNG exports. The main external consumers of Russia, 
whose share is up to 51% of total amount of export, are Germany (31.5 Bcm), Ukraine (24.15 
Bcm), Italy (20.80 Bcm) and Turkey (17.26).
49
 
Today, Gazprom’s share in local gas market is more than 84%. In spite of this, there are 
companies which have an aggressive future production strategy, such as Novatek, which was 
planning to produce 45 Bcm in 2010 and 65 Bcm in 2015, and Lukoil, which has similar 
aspirations. By 2015 non-Gazprom production should be at least 150 Bcm/year and could be as 
high as 200 Bcm/year.
50
 However, the real picture is that Russia’s independent gas producers 
face substantial uncertainties, many of which are related to Gazprom and Government decision-
making on the requirements – in terms of both gas and transport capacity – and regulation of the 
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 Besides, cementing Gazprom's role as Russia's sole natural gas exporter, the 
law extends the company's export monopoly to liquefied natural gas (LNG), and liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG). "The principle of a unified export channel has always been part of our 
export strategy, though it hasn't been set out in any normative documents or legislation," 
Gazprom spokesman Sergei Kupriyanov said. "Now it will become the law."
52
 All it means is 
that currently any development of independent gas producers is fully relied on Gazprom’s desire 
to involve such company in its own business cycle or not. The vivid example here is Gazprom 
and Novatek agreement, signed on March 23, 2010, regulating the terms and conditions of the 
export of liquefied natural gas produced by Novatek as part of the Yamal LNG project. Gazprom 




2.2. Gazprom - Russian quasi-gas-monopoly (profile) 
 
To understand Gazprom’s economic power and expansion potential, it is necessary to 
consider the company’s profile. 
Gazprom is Russia’s largest joint stock company with several hundred thousand registered 
stockholders domiciled both in Russia and abroad. The largest shareholder of Gazprom is the 
state
54
 (see Table 1). In mid-2005, after state run OAO Rosneftegaz acquired a 10.74% stake in 
OAO Gazprom, the share of the Russian Federation in OAO Gazprom grew to a controlling 
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stake of 50.002 per cent. The move enabled government to reinforce the state’s control over the 
Company, being of strategic significance for the national economy. Throughout 2008 the share 
capital structure didn’t undergo substantial changes.
55
  
Currently, Gazprom’s Chairman of the Board of Directors is Viktor Alexeyevich Zubkov, 
who succeeded Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev on June 27, 2008. Zubkov was the Prime 
Minister of Russia in the period September 2007 - May 2008, until Putin had taken over this 
position. However, Zubkov is still connected with the government by holding the post of First 
Deputy Prime minister. Gazprom’s Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chairman of 
Management Committee is Alexey Borisovich Miller. It’s worth pointing out, that from 1991 to 
1996 Miller has been working at the Committee for External Relations of the Mayor's Office in 
Saint Petersburg, under Vladimir Putin.   
According to the Gazprom’s Financial Report 2009
56
, prepared under International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS), net profit generated by the company was RUB624.6 bln (USD 
20.8bln), the growth in comparison with 2008 is 261%. While total revenue in the same period 
was RUB2,486.9bln (USD 82.9bln), which is relatively the same result as in 2008 
(RUB2,507.0bln or USD83.6bln). Such imposing net profit growth, in spite of similarity of 
revenue amounts, is the result of additional income sources (Item: Other Income and Expenses), 
mainly related to the Gazprom’s investments in other companies and benefits received from tax 
concessions. Thereby, according to the publication of the Fortune Global 500, Gazprom became 
the world's most profitable company in 2009 despite ranking 50th in revenue.
57
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The cost of fixed assets of the company at the end of 2009 was RUB9,431.4bln (314.4bln 
USD), with three main items as Buildings – RUB342.8bln (USD11.4bln), Structures and transfer 
mechanism - RUB7,903.4bln (USD263.4bln), Machinery and equipment - RUB1,177.3bln 
(USD39.2bln). According to the PFC Energy’s Top 50 Energy Companies for 2009, Gazprom’s 
market capitalization reached USD 144.2bln, that refers to the 10
th
 place in the list.
58
 
Gazprom holds the richest natural gas reserves in the world. Its share in the global and 
Russian gas resources accounts for around 17% and 70%, respectively.
59
 According to Russian 
A+B+C1 classifications Gazprom’s reserves are 33.6 Tcm. Gazprom’s 2009 production was at 
the level of 461.5
60
 Bcm that is 87.5% of total Russian production same year. The company is 
responsible for 10% of Russia’s GDP
61





2.3. Gazprom’s political involvement. 
 
There are many discussions about interconnection of Gazprom and Russian Government, 
which is more than formal relationships between authority and economic entity of the state. 
There is also highly circulating  statement that particularly since Vladimir Putin rose to power 
                                                          
58 “PFC Energy 50”, PFC Energy official site, December 16, 2010, http://www.pfcenergy.com/pfc50.aspx 
59 “Gazprom in questions and answers”  
60 “Production”, Gazprom official page, December 2, 2010, http://www.gazprom.com/production/ 
61 Zhdannikov Dmitry, “Gazprom debt burden to speed up gas crisis end”, Reuters, (Jan 12,2009), December 5, 2010, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE50B4LH20090112 
62 Blagov Sergei, “Gazprom Monopoly will continue to favor domestic market”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, (Issue 105, June 3 2008), 
December 6, 2010, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=33686 





nearly a decade ago, shows just how politicized the company is .
63  
"To a large extent, Gazprom 
is almost a proxy for the government," said Chris Weafer, chief strategist at UralSib, a Russian 
investment bank. "It is the state's company and its most important asset." 
64
There are more 
evidences of such fact than its refutations.  
As it was already mentioned, Gazprom is the quasi-gas monopoly, where Government is the 
main shareholder, the shareholder who creates all necessary conditions to strengthen Gazprom’s 
position in both local and overseas markets. It includes granting to Gazprom the status of sole 
gas exporter of natural gas, LNG and LPG, control under UGSS, and primary right to develop 
main gas fields in the country such as  Yamal Peninsula fields and the Shtokman field in the 
Barents Sea. With support of the Government, Gazprom has also tried to squeeze out foreign 
companies from the Russian domestic market. It succeeded in taking control from Shell and BP 
of the vast Sakhalin-2 project.
65
 As political scientist Margarita Balmaceda asserts, in Russian 
Government’s point of view, the break-up of the Gazprom monopoly - or of Gazprom itself - 
would be a mixed blessing: it would reduce Gazprom’s political power vis-a-vis the state, but it 
would also deprive the state of a foreign policy weapon for eventual use.
66
  
The Gazprom’s involvement in foreign policy of Russia can be vividly demonstrated by the 
Russia-Ukraine gas crisis. When in January 2009 Gazprom cut off all supplies 
to Europe travelling through Ukrainian pipelines, intensifying the political and economic crisis 
that has arisen out of a payments dispute between the two countries.
67
 The most remarkable fact 
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is that such decision cost Gazprom a massive financial losses, which is around $200 million a 
day, however, political goals, as destabilizing current political regime - hostile to the Russia 
and portraying Ukraine as an absolutely unworthy partner for Europe and an extremely 
unreliable transit country
68
, were reached.  
But actual connection go further than the official one - block of shares possession by 
government, current political elite in the face of President Dmitri Medvedev and Prime-Minister 
Vladimir Putin, are highly associated with Gazprom.  
 President Putin’s particular attention to the gas business and his eagerness in advocating 
Gazprom’s interests were well-known, there have been also multiple speculations that he fancies 
the position of CEO after the expected transfer of power to a new leader in May 2008.
69
 The 
mechanism that supports Putin’s personal involvement in the gas business has always remained 
opaque as both the Kremlin and the Gazprom HQ are hermetically closed entities that tolerate no 
leaks.
70  
However, such involvement can be confirmed, or at least supported , with the facts that 
current Gazprom’s Chairman of the Board of Directors - Viktor Zubkov is the former prime 
minister, who was holding this position during Putin’s presidency and currently present Putin’s 
First Deputy Prime minister, while Gazprom’s Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors and 
Chairman of Management Committee Alexey Miller has known Putin and as mentioned before, 
was  even serving  under Vladimir Putin in the Committee for External Relations of the Mayor's 
Office in Saint Petersburg, and finally Dmitri Medvedev who became Putin's appointed 
successor to the Russian presidency. 
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 At the position of first Deputy Prime Minister and Gazprom’s board Chairman, Medvedev 
took a leading role in the creation and putting into action Gazprom's aggressive strategy towards 
energy markets of CIS region. He was responsible for the Gazprom’s “hostile” pricing policy - 
higher gas tariffs for Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia in the period of 2004-2006. At the same time 
Medvedev used Gazprom’s increasing economic power in order to promote the Kremlin interests 
beyond the energy sector.  
The Kremlin’s attack on these ‘people who fuse power and capital’, as Putin put it
71
, began 
during first months after  Putin’s  election in March 2000, and  was directed to Gusinsky’s 
Media-Most empire, which owned a number of periodicals but most significantly the 
independent television station, NTV.
72
  To understand importance of NTV as a media platform, 
it is necessary to note that cable network had 260 partner stations broadcasting in more than 500 
hundred Russian cities and towns.
73
 In 2001, Medvedev headed negotiations with an investment 
consortium led by U.S. media mogul Ted Turner and financier George Soros over the possible 
purchase of the troubled NTV. The negotiations failed, Gusinsky had been forced by the Kremlin 
to leave the country, and NTV, became a part of Gazprom-Media, a subsidiary of Gazprom.
74
 
Gazprom soon also gained sway over the publishing arm of Media-Most, which in April 2001 
ceased publication of the daily newspaper Segodnya and replaced the staff of the weekly 
magazine Itogi. Gazprom-Media also gained control over the Ekho-Moskvy radio station and 
TNT.
75
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Therefore, politicization of Gazprom’s decision-making processes towards local and overseas 
markets has enough grounds to be proven. For this reason, the assertion that Gazprom’s 
expansion aspirations are also dependent on political ambitions of the state will be used in this 
work as part of reasoning of European countries’ opposition vis-a-vis expansion strategy of 
Russia's Gazprom into European gas market. 
 




CHAPTER 3. ANALYSIS OF CIS COUNTRIES NATURAL GAS MARKET. 
CONSIDERATION OF GAZPROM’S ENERGY POLICY HERE AS THE PART OF 
EXPANSION INTO EUROPEAN MARKET STRATEGY 
 
The CIS natural gas market involves many states in the region. But their consideration within 
the framework of this work will be limited based on potential to influence the European gas 
interests. To this date, only three countries, beside Russia, have such potential. These countries 
are Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. We do not take into account Ukraine and Belarus, 
which bear the function of CIS gas transferring to Europe and don’t have possibility to “fill the 
tube” independently.  
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are the part of European agenda towards Energy 
security. The reason is not only their substantial gas reserves but geographical location, which 
gives optimal way to link all parties to deliver the gas to European customers. The core of the 
agenda is Nabucco pipeline project. The pipeline will link the Eastern border of Turkey, to 
Baumgarten in Austria via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. In its turn Nabucco is planned to be 
filed with Azeri gas via projected Shah Deniz II pipeline and in long-term perspective with gas 
from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan via Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline. 
The goal of this part is to evaluate current condition of the local markets of these countries 












 2009 Kazakhstan’s proven gas reserves at 1.82 Tcm, with a 1.0% of global 
share. Kazakhstan has the 17
th
 largest natural gas reserves in the world and 3
rd 
in the CIS region. 
Such position makes Kazakhstan one of the major gas suppliers in the Post-soviet Area, together 
with Russia, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.   
However, talking about volume of reserves, the level of gas production should be considered, 
where Kazakhstan has achieved considerable growth, from 9.0 Bcm in 1999 to 32.2 Bcm in 2009 
(258% growth). According to several official forecasts, Kazakhstan’s gas production in 2015 
could vary between 60 and 80 Bcm per annum and could potentially reach 100 Bcm by 2020.
77
 
Kazakhstan’s local consumption is estimated at 19.6 Bcm in 2009, which is 2.1% (20.1 Bcm) 
less than in previous year - such drop is explained by the common economic downturn in year 
2008. The total growth of Kazakh gas consumption in past decade was 154.5%, when yearly 
average growth 10.3%.
78
. Thereby, taking into account the difference between forecasted 
production and consumption, we can estimate that volume of gas available for export could 
potentially reach 57.6 Bcm in 2020.    
Kazakhstan’s resource base and production capacity potentially could cover Europe’s needs 
of natural gas in the future. However, entering of Kazakhstan into European market also depends 
on several factors as external demand on Kazakh gas and possibility of its transportation towards 
European borders. 
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In 2009 the main Kazakhstan’s external gas consumer was Russia with a 9.82 Bcm, what is 
95.3% of total export. The remaining 4.7% is divided between Moldova with 0.44 Bcm (4.3%) 
and Kyrgyzstan with 0.04 Bcm (0.4%).
79
 Karachaganak field holds the most of Kazakh’s natural 
gas reserves and located in the Karachaganak field, with proven capacity of 1.36 Tcm. Russia's 
Orenburg natural gas processing plant is the main destination for the Karachaganak's output. 
Based on the agreement between Gazprom and Kazmunaigas in 2008, a joint venture 
KazRosGas was created, which will manage the Orenburg plant by 2012. The 7.93 Bcm of 
Karachaganak gas was delivered to the Orenburg plant in 2008. While the volume of Kazakh gas 
processed at Orenburg plant is projected to exceed 17.56 Bcm by 2012.
80
 
Necessary to mention, the Kazakh newly discovered world’s largest oil filed located in the 
North Caspian Sea approximately 50 miles offshore from Atyrau. The field is operated by ENI at 
18.52% and partnered by ExxonMobil (18.52%), Shell (18.52%), Total (18.52%). The Kashagan 
also concentrates imposing gas reserves, which are estimated at 489.5 Bcm.81 Once projected to 
have already begun operation, the Kashagan project is now set to come online in 2013.
82
 
Currently Kashagan doesn’t participate in national gas production cycle, but has a huge potential 
in the future.  
Kazakhstan has two separate export oriented natural gas distribution networks, which are the 
Central Asia Gas Pipeline (CAGP) and Central Asia Center (CAC). The CAC operation network, 
managed by Gazprom, has two branches of gas pipeline, which meet in the Beyneu city 
(southwestern Kazakhstan) with its final destination point in Alexandrov Gaiand – part of the 
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 The western branch takes its roots on Turkmenistan’s Caspian 
seacoast and has a capacity of 4.98 Bcm/year. The eastern branch originates in Turkmenistan’s 
southeastern gas fields and has a capacity of 59.5 Bcm/year. In December 2007, Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan announced signing an agreement to renovate and expand the 
western branch of the CAC pipeline and to construct a new Caspian gas pipeline paralleling the 
western branch with a capacity of 19.99 Bcm.
84
 This new pipeline, with a total capacity of 79.3 
Bcm,  is planned to be launched in 2012. However, as the result of Russia-Turkmen dispute (the 
subject will be deeply considered later in the work), construction of the pipeline has been paused 
in 2009.  
Necessary to note, that in 2007, the new player had appeared on Kazakh natural gas market. 
China's CNPC pledged to invest $2.2 billion in CAGP, which starts at Gedaim on the border of 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and extends 1,130 miles across Kazakhstan east to the Chinese 
border.
85  
CAGP system capacity to around 50 Bcm/year in order to accommodate Kazakh and 
Uzbek exports as well as the Turkmen baseload.
86
 The future capacity of CAGP is 60 Bcm/year 
committed by the three states – Turkmenistan (40), Uzbekistan (10) and Kazakhstan (10).
87
   
Currently, Kazakhstan has one main gas exporter - Russian Gazprom. As it was already 
noted the volume of natural gas consumed by Gazprom in year 2009 reached 95.3% of total 
Kazakh’s export. But starting from December 2009 Chinese CNPC became a new player on the 
Kazakh gas market. There are also numerous proposals to bring Central Asian gas to European 
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markets by pipeline through Caspian Sea. However, the probability of Kazakhstan’s entering into 
European gas market is quite low in a short period of time. 
 
3.2. Turkmen Natural Gas Market. 
 
Turkmenistan is the CIS’s second largest gas producer, and second largest gas exporter, after 
Russia.
88
 By current internationally-recognized gas reserves, Turkmenistan is fourth-largest
89
 in 
the world. BM cites proven reserves of 8.10 Tcm
90
, which is 4.3% 
91
 of total world gas reserves. 
Today, gas deposits found in Turkmenistan include 139 onshore and 10 on the Caspian shelf.
92
 
But reality is close to Kazakhstan’s case where Russia is dominant exporter of local gas. 
Currently, Gazprom has major share of Turkmen gas exports, based on Russian-Turkmen 25-
year Cooperation Agreement (2003). Under the Agreement, Gazprom Export (Gazprom’s wholly 
owned subsidiary) and Gas Transmission Company Turkmenneftegaz made a long-term contract 
to purchase and sell Turkmen natural gas.
93
 
In addition to the above, in 2007 Russia and Turkmenistan signed the Agreement on the Pre-
Caspian gas pipeline construction, the purpose of which is conveying natural gas from the 
Caspian Sea fields and other locations in Turkmenistan and the Republic of Kazakhstan 
to Russia.   
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However, dramatic shutdown in gas export was observed in 2009, the reason of which was 
Russia-Turkmenistan gas dispute.  The CAC-4 pipeline was originally closed because of an 
explosion on April 9th 2009, which Turkmenistan blamed on Gazprom. Turkmenistan 
announced on September 18th 2009 that the pipeline had been repaired, but that "technical 
discussions" with Gazprom precluded an immediate resumption of exports. In practice, the 
dispute has for some time openly been about the price that Gazprom is willing to pay for 
Turkmenistan's gas.
94
 As the result in December 2009 Gazprom and Turkmengaz signed the 
amendments to the long-term gas purchase and sale contract. Early in 2010 Turkmen gas 
supplies were recommenced. Since January 1, 2010 the gas price has been regulated under the 
equation adjusted for petroleum products pricing,
95
 pricing dispute was resolved. 
Thereby, according to the statistical data in 2009 the total Turkmenistan’s gas export was 
16.73 Bcm, the explosion reduced daily gas deliveries from Turkmenistan to Russia to just 8% of 
their previous level and, over the year, led to massive cutbacks in both production and exports.
96
  
According to the 2009 BP’s statistical reviews 
97
 Turkmen gas output fell to just 32.2 Bcm from 
59.5 Bcm in 2008 and exports had failed to 16.73 Bcm from 55.00 Bcm in the previous year
98
. 
Moreover, in spite of the fact that Russia guaranteed to resume natural gas imports from 
Turkmenistan in 2010
99
, it has cut the volume of gas purchased to 10.66 Bcm.  
However, the dispute made Turkmenistan to look for diversification of gas consumers. In 
July 2009, Turkmenistan and Iran signed the agreement to increase gas imports up to 0.034 
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Bcm/day, comparing with 0.023/day before.
100
  As the result, in 2009, the share of Russia in 
Turkmen gas exports failed to 63.7%, Iran became the second largest Turkmen gas consumer 
with 5.77 Bcm (34.5%), and third one was Kazakhstan with 0.3 Bcm (1.8%). Iran is expected to 
be the lead customer of Turkmen gas in 2009. However, it is possible that already in 2011, China 
will replace Iran on that place, thanks to CAGP pipeline. 
 
3.3. Azerbaijani Natural Gas Market. 
 
According to the BP’s statistical overview
101
, Azerbaijan’s proven gas reserves in year 2009 
were 1.31 Tcm, which is 0.7% of the global gas reserves.    
In 2009, Azerbaijan produced 13.3 Bcm, which is the same result with a previous year. 
However, the country showed substantial leap of gas production in 2008, the growth rate reached 
51%, and 125% growth over past decade.  The local gas consumption in 2009 was 7.7 Bcm, 
which is 16%. less than the same index in 2008. The share of Azerbaijan in total world 
consumption was estimated at 0.4%.  
Majority of Azeri natural gas is produced from offshore fields. The biggest natural gas field in 
the country is the Shah Deniz field, which started operating in 2006. The Guneshli field provides 
gas for domestic use, via an undersea gas pipeline to Sangachal Terminal at Baku. The 
Sangachal Terminal, as the world’s largest integrated oil and gas processing terminals, receives, 
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stores, and processes both crude oil and natural gas from the ACG fields and from Shah Deniz, 
then ships these hydrocarbons through the BTU and SCP pipelines for export.
102
    
In 2009 Azeri gas export was on the level of 7.19 Bcm. 4.96 Bcm or 69%.  of it was 
purchased by Turkey . The second largest consumer was Georgia with 1.33 Bcm and 18.5% 
share. The remaining 0.9 Bcm was divided between Greece and Iran as 7.0% and 5.6%. 
As at the end of 2009 Russia wasn’t involved in Azerbaijan gas export. However, based on 
agreement signed between Azerbaijan state energy company Socar and Gazprom in 2009
103
, 
starting from January 1 2010, Azeri natural gas in the amount of 1 Bcm
104
  will be delivered to 
Russia during the year via Gazi-Magomed-Mozdok pipeline, which was import oriented in the 
past. Moreover, In September 2010 in Baku, Gazprom and Socar signed a new agreement, which 
assumes purchasing of 2 Bcm in 2011 and further increase of this volume from 2012.  
The core of Azerbaijan's natural gas exports is the 555-mile South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), 
also referred to as the Baku-T'bilisi-Erzurum pipeline (BTE), with the final point 
in Erzurum, Turkey.
105
 The estimated capacity of the pipeline is about 21.8 Bcm /year. The gas 
from the pipeline covers the Georgia and Turkey demand.    
Azerbaijan also exports natural gas to Iran via the Baku-Astara Pipeline. In early 
2010, Iran and Azerbaijan signed an additional agreement which assumes increase in gas imports 
from Azebaijan to Iran, and volumes are likely to increase with the renovation of the pipeline 
and upgrades to the Astara gas compressor.
106
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In years 2014-2015, the European Union also plans to enter Azerbaijan gas market, thanks to 
the gas stalemate between Turkey and Azerbaijan planning the phase-2 development of 
Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz field. Output from which may play an important role in Europe's energy 
diversification efforts. Shah Deniz phase-2 is expected to produce up to 20 bcm of additional gas 
supplies and a variety of infrastructure projects—from the Nabucco gas pipeline, the 
Interconnector-Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI), and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), among others—




3.4. Gazprom’s strategy on market of CIS region. 
 
Russia's energy policy towards CIS region has, in the recent years, underwent a fundamental 
transformation from the previous business schemes of trade relations conducted according to a 
model of "gas for friendship" towards a more assertive "gas for cash" approach.
108
 Priorities 
changed for Russia; the short-term economic advantage was replaced by the long-term 
geopolitical perspectives, where Gazprom plays major role. 
In early 2008 Gazprom, Kazmunaigas, Uzbekneftegaz and Turkmengaz officially announced 
a shift to European gas prices in Central Asia in 2009. Yet there is no clear-cut formula on gas 
and not all the aspects have been arranged between the sides.
109
 Later Gazprom entered into 
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Azerbaijani gas market by signing the agreement with Azerbaijan state energy company Socar, 
which assumes purchasing sufficient volume of natural gas at the same pricing approach.  
Gazprom`s deal with the partners in CIS region came as unexpected but a decisive step to 
keep control under markets which are in the sphere of European interests. There is only one 
explanation why Russia, as a state with the biggest gas reserves and streamlined infrastructure, 
purchases gas from other countries at the market price, Russia tries to deprive Europe of 
alternative south gas route, to fulfill fuel deficit by its own export opportunities. 
The main project, which involved Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan into European 
plans to bring Central Asian gas to Europe, was Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP). The 
original TCGP had been planned by Bechtel, General Electric, and Royal Dutch Shell during the 
late 1990’s, for a total capacity of 32 Bcm/year, in two stages of 16 Bcm each (the first stage was 
planned to supply Turkey, the second was envisaged for Europe).
110
 However, that project lost 
out to Gazprom in a race for the Turkish market by 2001. Western support dissipated after that, 
and Russia intimidated Turkmenistan into silence about a trans-Caspian pipeline until now.
111
 
On November 18-19, 2010, Turkmenistan mentioned the possibility to deliver to Europe 
about 40 Bcm of natural gas annually, via a pipeline through the Caspian Sea, which will be 
linked up to the Nabucco project. The decision appeared as the result of 2009 Russian-Turkmen 
gas dispute, when, as analytics assert, Turkmenistan was losing an estimated USD1bn per month 
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 This situation pushed Turkmenistan to looking for diversification of its gas 
sales abroad. 
Concerning Kazakhstan it can’t be said that this country is actively looking for gas export 
opportunities in Europe, but existence of Kashagan as international project, which is 
conveniently located in Kazakhstan’s Caspian offshore, contributes into desire to pipe this gas  
under the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan so as to enter the South Caucasus Pipeline (Baku-Tbilisi-
Erzurum) and eventually, through Turkey, reaches Europe.
113
 
But there are some obstacles, which don’t allow Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to acquire the 
status of new European gas suppliers at the nearest future. The first one is unresolved legal status 
of the Caspian Sea is a stumbling block insofar as Turkmenistan, the same  as Kazakhstan, feels 
obliged to take Russia's interests into account in formulating its own energy export policy. 
Russia insists, as a way of blocking the TCGP, that the agreement of all five littoral states is 
necessary for any trans-Caspian pipeline to be built.
114
 The second one is current economic 
interconnections between countries. Gazprom today dominates on Central Asian energy market. 
As it was already noted, in year 2009, the volume of Kazakh gas purchased by Gazprom reached 
9.82 Bcm, what is the 95.3% of total export of the state, when share of Gazprom in gas export of 
Turkmenistan in the same year was 63.7% (10.66 Bcm). Thereby, the most real opportunity for 
Europe to bring gas from the East to its borders, is Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz phase-2 project. 
 In regards to Azerbaijan, Gazprom’s position was quite precarious in the not far past. We 
can support this fact mentioning that till the end of 2009 Gazprom wasn’t involved in 
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Azerbaijani gas market at all. But already starting from 2010 based on the agreement between 
Gazprom and Socar, the volume of gas planned to be exported is 1 Bcm, with a further 
increasing of this figure up to 2 Bcm in 2011. The volume of gas export is limited only with a 
capacity of the Gazi-Magomed-Mozdok pipeline, which is 8 Bcm/year.  
But still, Azerbaijani government insists that cooperation with Gazprom won’t affect plans to 
deliver Azerbaijani gas to the European consumers. In a March 30, 2010 Socar President Rovnag 
Abdullayev stressed that the deal with Gazprom will not touch gas from Stage 2 of the Shah 
Deniz project, a mega gas source (10-12 bcm per year), scheduled to come online in 2014-2015. 
It is Stage 2 gas that has been the focus of competition between Russia and European Union 
countries. "This gas [from "Shah Deniz] is a matter for separate negotiations," Abdullayev said. 
"The memorandum with Gazprom is about gas from Socar's own fields."
115
 
But the main question does Russia really seek to increase its imports of Azerbaijani gas to the 
maximum possible extent, so as to reduce the volumes available to Nabucco
116 
as political 
analyst Vladimir Socor asserts. It sounds more like utopia than reality. According to the author 
point of view reality is more complicated than it seems.  
As Socar President Rovnag Abdullayev said -  “Selling gas for a good price "is one of the 
main interests of Azerbaijan and we are considering any route and conducting talks with 
companies and countries."
117
  Gazprom currently buys Azeri gas at market price and has a strong 
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desire to increase its volume in a short period of time. Investment in Phase 2 of the Shah Deniz 
project is estimated at $16 billion, compared to the $5 billion invested in Phase 1. Is there any 
economic point for Azerbaijan to invest in risky perspective, rather than use currently available 
offers? Russia has price dumping advantage over Azerbaijan on European market, when 
dumping for Azerbaijan is money loss on gas which would be sold to Russia at market price, 
which is not in Azerbaijani interests.  
If we consider this situation from the position of European Union, there is conflict of 
interests - get fuel at remunerative price, but lower energetic security and possibly providing 
Russia with instruments for political pressure.  

















CHAPTER 4. ANALYSIS OF NATURAL GAS MARKET OF EUROPE 
 
4.1. European Natural Gas Market. 
  
Natural gas is currently the second most important fuel in the European Union. This 
represents 25 percent of the total gross inland consumption in the EU (see Figure 2). According 
to the 2009 Eurostat’s statistical overview, EU-27 gross inland consumption was 393.4 billion 
cubic meters (bcm), which was less than the same index in 2008 by 6.3%.
118
 The decline in 
consumption is due to the economic uncertainty following the recent economic crisis in Europe. 
EU-27 consumption is mainly relied on the biggest European economies as Germany, which 
consumes 72.6 bcm/year (18.5 percent) United Kingdom- 73.0 bcm/year (18.6 percent), Italy – 
60.8 bcm/year (15.5 percent) and France - 36.3 bm/year (9.2 percent).
119
 Figure 3 illustrates the 
intensity of energy consumption in EU-27. The total dependence of EU on gas imports can be 




Statistics on the trends in annual dependency rates in the EU show that the EU-27 Energy 
Dependence Rate increased by 2.8 percent from 61.5 percent in 2008 to 64.3 percent in 2009.
121
 
The least dependent EU countries are Denmark and the Netherlands, which recorded a negative 
dependency. The most dependent countries in 2008 were Spain and Italy and later expanded to 
the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Netherlands in 2009 (see Figure 4). Other countries 
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with moderate dependence in 2009 were Russia at 33 percent, Norway at 28.8 percent and 
Algeria at 14.7 percent.
122
 
Europe’s natural gas market shows heavy dependence on exporters outside the European 
Union (EU). Statistics show that Europe obtained forty-seven percent of its natural gas supplies 
from external sources in 2009.
123
 At present, the leading source of natural gas imports to Europe 
is Gazprom. Gazprom produces 85 percent of natural gas in Russia and has monopoly share in 
natural gas export to Europe.  
The Natural Gas Information reports that this dependence on the Russian company’s gas 
is disproportionate with Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Latvia Estonia and Lithuania importing 
more than seventy percent of their natural gas from Russia compared to forty percent dependence 
in EU countries.
124
 This overdependence and the potential negative impact on EU countries in 
the event of gas supply disruptions have necessitated the need for gas import diversification.  
The EU natural gas market has undergone dramatic changes in the last twenty years. For 
instance, the UK passed the Oil and Gas Act in 1982 to reduce the monopoly of British Gas and 
introduce competition in the transmission and distribution of natural gas in the country. The Oil 
and Gas Act laid the foundation for the creation of licensing schemes for private companies to 
engage in natural gas transport and supply.
125
  
Another change to the EU natural gas market is the introduction of the Network Code. 
The Network Code is a framework defining the relationship between pipeline system operators 
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and the transporters. Introduced in the UK market, the framework aimed to optimize the safety of 
the UK gas pipeline system and ensure operational efficiencies in the transmission and 
distribution of gas by Transco Company.
126
 These operational efficiencies arise from strict 
monitoring of the gas pipeline system to control the intake of gas into the pipeline system, off-
take from the system (withdrawal of gas from the pipeline system) and the physical distribution 
to the national network. Gas producers or distributors who inject or withdraw more gas from the 
pipeline than contracted impose additional costs to other pipeline system users.
127
 The Network 
Code imposes penalties for the distributors or producers for breaching the balancing and 
tolerance levels of gas and causing supply disruptions in the gas network. 
The UK and EU gas markets have certain balancing mechanisms to ensure that system 
operators use up-to-date market prices of natural gas that are based on the balancing price. This 
deregulation of has improved gas supplies as distribution is not limited to long-term contracts, 
but creates a demand for short-term contracts by new entrants to supply gas surpluses to the 
market. These deregulations and frameworks illuminate the complexity of natural gas production 
and distribution in the EU.
128
 
Although the deregulations exist, natural gas production in the EU is often left in the 
hands of external parties compared to distribution. This is because each member state 
implements different competition dynamics that govern the gas industry’s value chain.
129
 Factors 
influencing the production of natural gas in the EU include price, output and competition; 
efficiency; and capacity. According to Brakman, Marrewijk, and Witteloostuijin, the EU natural 
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gas industry depicts the Cournot model of industrial organizations.
130
 This model contrasts with 
the Bertrand model used in gas transport and delivery. As regards competition, a few producers 
control the EU gas market. Gas is a homogenous product that is produced by few manufacturers 
in large volumes. The key producers of the EU gas market are Algeria, the Norway, Russia and 
the Netherlands.
131
 These producing countries are characterized by state monopoly in natural gas 
production. 
The second factor affecting the gas production is efficiency. EU gas suppliers are not 
equally efficient. For instance, the Dutch Gasunie is reported more reliable than Russia’s 
Gazprom Company because the former is a private-public joint venture while the latter is a state-
run monopoly prone to management interference.
132
 Additional factors influencing the efficiency 
of the EU gas market include the cost of gas production and the distribution distance. Gas 
production depends on geophysical characteristics (such as the cost of developing new gas fields 
and transporting natural gas to import markets) caused by the depletion of nearby natural gas 
fields. This implies that future gas production will be more costly and inefficient due as existing 
gas resources deplete. Figure 5 illustrates the linear gas supply curve of EU suppliers. The curve 
shows a 98 percent variance in marginal costs arising from supplier inefficiencies. 
The final aspect affecting gas production in the EU is capacity. Gas production cannot be 
expanded ad infinitum. An analysis of the export potential of the three main EU suppliers: 
Algeria, Norway and Russia show that each supplier faces capacity constraints. Russia’s export 
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capacity is expected to increase marginally to 207 bcm in 2030 from 166 bcm in 2010.
133
 The 
marginal increase is caused by the finite availability of natural gas resource. Since natural gas is 
a nonrenewable resource, the capacity of gas exports is therefore limited to the amount of gas 
reserves in the three exporting countries. 
Despite the capacity constraints of the gas exporting industries, the demand for natural 
gas in Europe has increased exponentially in recent years. Brakman, Marrewijk, and 
Witteloostuijin argue that the increased need for gas in power plants and the environmental 
benefits of gas over coal power have contributed to the rise in gas demand.
134
 Figure 6 shows the 
total demand for natural gas in the EU particularly, the UK, Spain, Netherlands, Italy, Germany, 
France and Belgium. The liberalization of the European gas market has also contributed to the 
increased demand for natural gas. The implementation of the Gas Directive initiated the 
liberalization of the EU gas market for gas producers and suppliers.
135
 
The EU Gas Directive supports the liberalization of the gas industry by defining a 
regulatory space for each member state. According to the directive, member states should allow 
third party suppliers to access their local gas market through negotiated or regulated agreements. 
Member states are also allowed to impose public service regulations on the third-party gas 
utilities relating to the reliability and security of supply, quality of supply and gas prices.
136
 
Presently, individual member states such as France and the Netherlands have implemented 
policies to support third party access to local gas supply networks. The outcome of the gas 
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Presently, Europe’s gas industry is characterized by the monopolization of national 
transmission and distribution. State-owned oil producing companies directly supply about fifty 
percent of the total gas market and have monopoly control on regional distribution of natural 
gas.
138
 The state-owned companies in Russia, Algeria, Norway, the UK and the Netherlands have 
direct connection to the EU pipeline infrastructure for gas reserves. For instance, Gazprom’s gas 
reserves exceed EU gas reserves, and explain Russia’s dominance in the gas export market.  
Russia’s expansion strategy aims to increase dependence on natural gas to make it the 
leading exporter of natural gas and dominant political power in the EU. Part of the expansion 
strategy was to increase government stake in Gazprom to fifty percent. This made Gazprom a 
profitable economic entity that depends on state decisions. Consequently, there has been 
increasing opposition to the Russian state’s involvement in the company and Europe’s fear on its 
over-reliance on Russian gas exports and political involvement in the EU. 
 
4.2 .Gazprom’s Expansion Policy towards European Market. 
 
The core of Gazprom’s expansion policy centers on two main projects: The Nord Stream 
Pipeline and the South Stream pipeline. Gazprom has already started work on the Nord Stream, 
which would transport natural gas from Russia to Germany via a pipeline under the Baltic Sea 
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(see Figure 8). The Nord Stream has a capacity of 55 bcm per year,
139
 which is approximately 
30.56 percent of Gazprom’s annual gas exports to Europe. The motive for the underwater 
pipeline is that enables the company to bypass the central and eastern states, considering that 
Russia has been facing difficulties in securing control of the energy infrastructure in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Another reason for Gazprom’s investment in the Baltic pipeline is that the 
company would be able to expand the pipeline and the oil terminal at Primorsk, thereby 
eliminating the dependence of oil terminals in the Baltic States, such as the Ventspils port in 
Latvia and Butinge in Lithuania.  
Work on the South Steam has not yet begun. The South Stream is a gas pipeline running 
from Russia under the Black Sea to the Balkans, and branches to Austria and Italy (see Figure 9). 
The motive for this route is that Gazprom would also be able to bypass Poland, Ukraine and 
other central European states, and it can expand the pipeline infrastructure without political 
interference from EU states. Once completed in 2015, Gazprom expects the project to provide a 
capacity of 63 bcm per year.
140
 Other countries that have expressed their interest in and signed 
on to the project include Serbia, Hungary and Bulgaria. The Nord and South Stream provide 
Russia with alternative transit routes through the European and reduce the leverage that transit 
countries, especially those in central and eastern Europe, have in negotiating with Gazprom and 
other energy firms. Although some experts claim the routes will outstrip Russia’s oil and gas 
capacity, Gazprom believes that the two streams support Russia’s energy policy on reducing the 
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attractiveness of other routes that bypass it for oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia and 
Azerbaijan to Europe and Asia.
141
 
To achieve the expansion goals, Gazprom plans to implement processes to retain its 
position as the leading EU gas supplier, enter new geographical market (such as the United 
States and Asia Pacific regions), diversify its product lines, expand its sales performance with 
end consumers and improve its economic efficiency.
142
 To facilitate these growth and expansion 
strategies, Gazprom has improved the economic and resource capacity of Gazpromexport, its 
subsidiary company in charge of natural gas exports. 
A review of historical data shows that Gazpromexport/Gazprom has been the global 
exporter of natural gas to Europe. It supplied more than 145 billion cubic meters worth 25 billion 
dollars in 2005 and increased the supplies to 180 billion cubic meters in 2008.
143
 In addition, it 
was one of the few gas suppliers that with investments in technical and organizational 
infrastructure. The company invested in gas pipelines, underground storage of gas and joint 
ventures with competing firms. For instance, Gazprom liaised with the OMV group to acquire a 
large gas market segment in Austria.
144
 These investments and collaborations were part of 
Gazprom’s aggressive expansion policy on the European gas market. 
To facilitate its infrastructural expansion into the European market, Gazprom also 
increased its prices for Central Asia gas supplies. This price increase was a strategic measure to 
improve the company’s market share and position in the European market. According to 
Bochkarev’s article on the Gazprom’s strategic engagement in the Central Asia region, the gas 
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prices increase in Central Asia to the European consumer prices aimed to reduce domestic gas 
production and enable the company to delay hydrocarbon exploitation in the Siberian and the 
Arctic reserves. In so doing, Gazprom hoped to increase its long-term strategic position in the 
European gas market and overthrow other competitors by risking short-term profits for long-term 
strategic benefits.  
Another method that Gazprom used to overthrow competitors was to exert state influence 
in the gas industry. For instance, the company used its monopoly power to receive government 
support in mandating the use of Central Asia gas in fulfilling its contractual obligations. Through 
the Russian Energy Strategy, the company was able to reduce exploitation of Siberian and Arctic 
reserves and make this exploitation expensive for competitors.
145
 This enabled the company to 
prevent a price war with Central Asian suppliers that would have negatively affected Gazprom as 
the company was still recovering from the global financial crisis. 
A core aspect of the European business strategy was to transfer to European pricing and 
acquire long-term contracts for gas supply in the EU. Firstly, the increase in Central Asian prices 
to EU consumer gas prices facilitated the transfer to European prices. For instance, Gazprom 
increased its gas prices to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan from $140-160 per Mcm of 
gas (thousand cubic meters) in 2008 to $340 per Mcm in 2009.
146
 The company even expanded 
its price increase to Azerbaijan to reduce domestic gas production. Consequently, Gazprom was 
able to replace intermediary firms to facilitate quicker gas transactions from Central Asia to 
Ukraine.  
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The contract replacement forced Ukraine to change its gas supplier from RusUkrEnergo 
to Gazprom. Ukraine’s contract replacement and the acquisition and control of Belarus pipeline 
system to supply gas to Poland demonstrate Gazprom’s long-term acquisition strategy for the EU 
gas market. The company used the European price-transfer method to acquire long-term sales 
and transit contracts between Ukraine and Belarus. The retention of the long-term contracts 
enabled the company to take over domestic gas infrastructure and charge high prices for gas 
supply to other countries. It also supported gas infrastructural investments such as pipeline 
systems, underground storage and joint ventures. For instance, Gazprom liaised with the OMV 
group to acquire a large gas market segment in Austria.
147
 These investments and collaborations 
were part of Gazprom’s aggressive expansion policy on the European gas market. 
According to Kupchinsky’s report in the Eurasia Daily Monitor, the state-owned 
corporation collaborated with the Australia’s OM oil and gas group, the Vienna Stock Exchange 
and the Centrex Europe Energy and Gas AG (CEEGAG) to develop a gas hub for the European 
market. The gas hub, termed as the Central European Gas Hub (CEGH), is located in Austria. 




However, the expansion plan has generated criticism from the public. Firstly, there are 
concerns about the establishment of the CEEGAG and the Centex group. Gazprom’s website 
indicates that the CEEGAG was founded by a subsidiary of the company, but the Eurasia Daily 
Monitor reports that the group was registered in Switzerland and owned by private energy 
companies in Cyprus and Austria. Moreover, CEEGAG did not pay any dividends on profits, 
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which is contrary to the legal requirements of private companies.
149
 Consequently, Gazprom’s 
difficulty in hiding the relationship with CEEGAG through Gazprombank indicates that the 
information on CEEGAG and Centrex is incomplete, which further heightens public concern on 
Gazprom’s scandals.  
To begin with, the Centrex Group website makes no formal mention of Gazprom, 
although it claims to own a subsidiary company in Russia operating in the extraction and 
marketing of hydrocarbon reserves. These claims are contrary to Gazprom’s assertion that 
Gazprom Bank founded the Centrex Group. Secondly, the European Commission supports the 
claim that the supposed non-existent relationship between Gazprom and Centrex does not 
explain how Centrex has privileged access to gas sources in Russia and the EU gas market.
150
 
For instance, the managers of Centrex have repeatedly denied knowledge of Gazprom’s 
management, although the company claimed to own Centrex group (Zug, Switzerland) is owned 
partly by the deputy chief executive officer of Gazprom.
151
 The same company (Zug) has also 
been accused repeatedly of having criminal connections in Russia and abroad.  
The mystery behind Gazprom’s strategic collaboration with industry partners elucidates 
Europe’s concern on control share of the European gas hub. If Centrex is lined to Gazprom, it 
implies that the latter will control 50 percent of the strategic central European. The control share 
will expose the European gas hub to sabotage, especially the Nabucco pipeline that will pass 
through Baumgartner and serve as a conduit for money laundering by state officials into foreign 
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accounts in Russia and Austria, as well as offshore accounts.
152
 These supply contract concerns 
have necessitated an antitrust probe by the EU.  
The EU antitrust probe evaluates Gazprom’s long-term gas supply contracts with 
European companies to identify any irregularities in pricing and supply.
153
 This probe is 
necessary because it allows the European Commission access to gas capacity information that is 
restricted from regulators. The European Commission raided Gazprom’s units including the 





4.3. European Fears. 
  
Gazprom supplies 25 percent of the total European energy needs and currently hopes to 
expand its supply capacity to the EU. There are fears the European gas market is heavily 
dependent on the Russian company, which exposes it to price, supply, efficiency and capacity 
constraints affecting the firm. Moreover, the reliance on Gazprom exposes EU countries to 
infrastructural and economic exploitation by the state-owned corporation.
155
 Consequently, the 
European Union has established diversification strategies by identifying alternative reliable and 
efficient energy supplies, and opening up domestic markets and pipelines to the international 
                                                          
152
 Kupchinsky Roman 
153 White, Aoife, and Anna Shiryaevskaya. “Gazprom gas supply contracts are focus of EU’s antitrust probe.” Bloomberg 
Businessweek. 28 September 2011, 4 November 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-09-28/gazprom-gas-supply-
contracts-are-focus-of-eu-s-antitrust-probe.html 
 
154 White, Aoife, and Anna Shiryaevskaya 
155 White, Aoife, and Anna Shiryaevskaya 






 The European Union hopes the diversification of energy suppliers and trade will 
reduce the cartel trade between consumers and energy suppliers.
157
 
One way that the EU can diversify its energy supply is to invest in shale gas and 
renewable energy. Figure 7 provides global gas estimates for different regions. Shale gas 
explorations are currently being conducted in Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Austria, the 
United Kingdom and Ukraine.
158
 According to Jozwiak, Poland has the largest shale gas reserve 
in Europe, estimated at 5.3 trillion cubic meters or 30.28 percent of the recoverable shale gas in 
the EU. It granted 68 concessions to companies from the United States and Canada to explore 
gas in the country. Results of seismic surveys show that Poland’s gas supplies could topple 
Russia as the leading gas supplier because 56 percent of the extractions will increase gas reserves 
by 750 percent. Moreover, Poland promotes a competitive business environment by establishing 




Although there are concerns about the geology, depletion rate of gas wells and public 
acceptance of a cheaper form of gas, proponents believe that shale gas is an unconventional 
solution to Russian domination.
160
 They propose that these Western European countries should 
improve investment conditions by providing tax breaks and maintain a vibrant service sector. 
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The countries should also implement measures to control the depletion of the gas wells estimated 
at eight to twelve years compared to the thirty to forty years for conventional gas wells.
161
 
The EU has also taken measures to curb the cartel trade between suppliers and consumers 
such as initiating the European Commission’s probe on Gazprom. The probe has elicited political 
reactions in Europe.
162
 Russia’s president asserted that his government would examine the 
probing process much closely to ensure that the rights of the investors and gas suppliers were 
respected.
163
 Other than the probe, the European Union has implemented a counteraction policy 
to prevent Gazprom’s expansion to the EU. For instance, Germany and the Czech Republic, 
through the energy companies RWE and E.ON respectively, have weakened the link between gas 
and oil prices in the supply contracts with Gazprom. The weakening has helped the companies 
recover from the losses incurred using crude oil prices as the basis for supply prices. Another 
counteraction policy is the probe’s demand that Gazprom provides similar pricing to all gas 
consumers in Europe, instead of the selective discounting used by the company.
164
 The final 
counteraction policy has been to complicate the purchase of the European gas hub (CEGH) in 
Austria. Gazprom has objected to the purchase conditions arguing the requirements aim to 
discourage the company from expanding into the European gas market.  
The EU’s decision to diversify the energy industry by sourcing from external energy 
suppliers, opening up domestic markets and pipelines to the international market, and focusing 
on alternative energy sources (such as shale gas and renewable energy) will improve competition 
and investment in the energy industry.
165
 The Union enacted legislation in 2009 to support the 
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diversification strategies and reduce the current monopoly control in gas supply and distribution. 
This legislation made the EU responsible for monitoring the energy supply contracts between 
European consumers and producers to ensure that stakeholders respect the EU rules of 
competition. 
In summary, the European gas market should not be entirely dependent on monopoly 
suppliers. It should implement balancing mechanisms to avoid price and supply exploitation by 
companies such as Gazprom by implementing policies for competitive supply, incentivize 
international companies to invest in gas supply and distribution through tax breaks and financial 
support, and invest in alternative energy industries. As regards the gas industry, the EU should 
monitor price determination by operators and deregulate gas supply through short-term contracts. 
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CHAPTER 5. COMPETING PIPELINES. CONSIDERATION OF SOUTH STREAM AND 
NABUCCO AS THE MAIN COMPETING PROJECTS OF RUSSIA AND EUROPE 
 
The South Stream and the Nabucco projects are the two largest competitors for the 
European Union natural gas supply industry. Analysts claim that the South Stream, under 
supervision of Gazprom, is likely to emerge victorious.
166
 They posit that although Nabucco has 
sufficient backing of the EU and the US, the project cannot counter the influence of the South 
Stream because it has no comprehensive supervisory executive. The South project has the 
sufficient financial backing from the Russia and ENI, an Italian firm. Nabucco, on the other 
hand, has been vulnerable to personnel and financing shortage, despite pledges for financial 
support from the European Commission, the European Investment Bank and the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development in 2009. Additionally, some of the transit and supplier 
nations in the Nabucco project are still undecided about the cost-benefit implications for each 
country. Nevertheless, the South Stream and Nabucco projects remain competitive tactical 
approaches to EU’s oil and natural gas supply problem.  
The Nabucco project powerfully supported by the EU is going forward. The EU made a 
resolution on February 2010 to procure steel to build the 3,900 km pipeline with an expected 
annual capacity of 31 Bcm. The one-phased construction is expected to start in 2013 and have 
the first gas flow in 2017 (Nabucco Gas Pipeline). The resolution to create an alternative energy 
supply network is salient since there is room for more than one transfer conduit that is currently 
under the South Stream monopoly. The subject of energy supply diversification has turned out to 
be increasingly significant in the late 2000s going by the number of pipeline projects in the EU 
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that were motivated by political need to reduce overreliance on Russian energy supply and 
protect the sovereignty of the member states.  
By facilitating diversification of gas import resources, the EU has built up a firm overseas 
strategy through the Southern Corridor. This is believed to assist European economies connect to 
the richest natural gas regions in the world, the Caspian region, Middle East and Egypt (Nabucco 
Gas Pipeline). Since 2006, EU has exhaustively been encouraging the Nabucco project to reach 
at gas sources of Azerbaidjan, Kazkhstan, Turkmenistan, and perhaps Iran, Iraq and Egypt.
167
 
Certainly, the implementation of the Nabucco project is political, since it aspires to conquer the 
Russian gas import domination on the Central and Eastern European economies. The South 
Stream is Russia’s consolidation strategy to avert the threat posed by Nabucco. It weakens the 
monopoly that Ukraine and Belarus have on the European gas market and leverages Russia’s 
position in the EU by blocking Nabucco’s construction. Russia obstructs Nabucco’s progress by 
attracting the competitor’s gas suppliers and closing off the Azerbaijan and other terminal links 
through acquisitions.  
Although the sponsorship for the South Stream and Nabucco pipeline projects aims to 
serve the interests of the stakeholders, both projects provide the EU with a solution to its rising 
energy demands. The projects use different routes to provide natural gas to the European market, 
and upon completion, these pipelines are expected to improve the reliability of natural gas 
supplies in the region. The projects promote competition in the energy industry by reducing 
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dominance of gas producing and supply countries in Europe. The South Stream and Nabucco 
projects remain competitive tactical approaches to EU’s oil and natural gas supply problem.  
 
5.1. Nabucco Pipeline Project. 
 
The Nabucco conduit, also denoted as Turkey-Austria gas pipeline is an anticipated 
natural energy conduit from Erzurum in Turkey to Baumgarten an der March in Austria 
expanding natural gas provision and distribution routes for Europe. It reduces the European 
reliance on Russian power. The plan is financed by a few European Union nations and the 
United States and is perceived as an adversary to the Gazprom-Eni South Stream pipeline plan. 
Simultaneously, there are a number of reservations regarding the possibility of supplies.  
The major contractor is predicted to be Iraq in collaboration with Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan and Egypt. Conversely, the Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) plan, which 
Turkmenistan intends to employ to transport its gas to Azerbaijan, is at the preliminary 
deliberation phase. Bearing in mind the rising gas demand in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, 
Azerbaijan will not have sufficient gas in the 15 years to offer needed capacities to European 
consumers. Besides, Turkmenistan’s gas productivity is constricted to Russia up until 2028 and 
the likelihood of Iranian gas is far from pragmatic owing to its nuclear agenda. Accordingly, the 
Nabucco conduit could be unfilled.
168
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 Arrangements for the Nabucco venture begun in 2002 and the intergovernmental 
accord involving Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria was arrived at on 13, July 
2009. Currently, the project is still not complete mainly because of the difficulties experienced in 
sourcing gas. The conglomerate of six corporations is in charge of building up the plan. If put up, 
the conduit is projected to be functional before 2017 and it will take, 31 Bcm - 1.1 trillion cubic 
feet of natural gas yearly. In the Trans-European pact - power agenda, the Nabucco conduit is 
perceived as of tactical significance. The intention of the plan is to bond the European Union 
better to the natural gas resources in the Caspian Ocean and the Middle East area. The 
development of the plan has been motivated by the objective of the EU to expand its present 
power provisions, and to reduce European reliance on Russian power, the main dealer of gas in 
Europe.  
Furthermore, as stated by European Commission, Europe's gas utilization is projected to 
augment from 502 Bcm, in 2005, to 815 Bcm in 2030, which implies that supplies from Russia 
only would not be able to sustain the market. According to Nobuo Tanaka, the managerial 
administrator of the global Energy bureau, the Nabucco conduit would be more successful in 
rising Europe's power safety than the South Stream scheme as it amplifies the figure of gas 
contractors.
169
 Presently, the idea is yet to be put in practice since states are still weighing the 
benefits of the venture.  
Whereas the majorities of Western European nations as well as the United States, in their 
expedition to power safety, perceive the Nabucco plan as a hopeful footstep. Gazprom, the major 
exporter of Russian natural energy has wished for a pipeline that would be in opposition to 
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Nabucco, popularly termed as the South Stream. The Nabucco plan was initially instigated in 
2002. However, because of hullabaloo and deficiency of unity, only Turkey was ready to enter 
into contract in 2009, and complete financial support was not to be legitimately billed at least 
until the beginning of 2011. One of the major tribulations is where the supply will originate. 
Presently, Russia provides one third of all of E.U’s gas requirements, which is mostly 
utilized for cooking. The frequent inconsistencies have been prompted by Kiev’s repudiation to 
reimburse augmented costs of gas and have made Europe to comprehend the explosive political 
environment of energy safety. In addition, with Europe’s escalating demand for natural energy, 
this matter of diversification is more critical. The Nabucco line would reduce Europe’s reliance 
on Russia for natural energy and permit Europe to expand its delivery, offering it more power 
safety in the end, particularly bearing in mind that the expenditure is expected to increase. If 
Nabucco was to descend the opinion, it could also cultivate a successful energy enterprise that 
could help enhance relationships between the E.U. and non-E.U. states such as Turkey and 
Azerbaijan. Furthermore, this has the possibility of changing the Central Asian nations into more 
sovereign, independent policy makers, as opposed to the current situation whereby they are 
accessories of Russia. In addition, Nabucco is a comparatively economical venture ($6.2 billion 
with some scholars posting $10.4 billion); evaluated against the amount of cash Europe is using 
to import gas from Russia together with the capital it will require to spend on road and rail 
network developments in upcoming years. 
The Shah Deniz’s provision of natural energy that is, Azerbaijan would simply be 
possible for an initial commercial stage of shipment to Europe. Nevertheless, sustained provision 
could originate from different sources involving Central Asia that is, Turkmenistan. On the other 
hand, contracts in Central Asia have been challenged by Russia. For instance, South Stream and 
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Gazprom have entered into agreements for the supply stream of gas from Turkmenistan leading 
to questions on whether the Trans-Caspian line will not be constructed. Furthermore, although 
the Iranian alternative is pursued, majority of its major field in South Pars is devoted to local 
utility. Iran would additionally need to modernize its road and rail network, expand its fields 
prior to the materialization of the Nabucco project. Whereas there is more than one alternative 
for additional gas delivery to Nabucco, the threats are huge, as majority of these providing states 
are geopolitically divisive and a few are even unsteady to provide gas to Europe. Moreover, the 
expenses incurred in constructing extra pipelines to maintain Nabucco would be exorbitant. 
These potentialities do not seem as practical as continuing to rely on Russian provision. Besides, 
it is argued that although the political and infrastructural tribulations can be defeated, there are 
severe delivery difficulties that have to be tackled in these Middle Eastern countries. 
Another problem facing Nabucco pipeline is the clandestine investment that is not 
supported by any country as compared to the South Stream pipeline. Subsequent to the rigid 
striking financial emergency, clandestine financiers will be less prepared to spend in an 
expensive conduit and countries will choose to gain energy security through easier (and 
relatively more secure) options such as Gazprom sponsored projects, especially if gas sources are 
not fully secured for continued supply through Nabucco. 
Because of Nabucco’s debate that has been described by Russia’s adversaries as waning 
European reliance on their natural gas, Gazprom has come up with several diverse pipeline 
suggestions including their most assertively aggressive line that is seen as Nabucco’s immediate 
challenger, the South Stream. South Stream and Nabucco are premeditated to overlie. Whereas 
this could be factual, several scholars claim that Gazprom will not be competent enough to 
Chapter 5. Competing Pipelines. Consideration of “South Stream” and “Nabucco” as the Main 




provide all of the lines it has projected but is rather warming up for greater things in Europe’s 
gas market.  
In case South Stream was to be put up, Russia would have power over a larger segment 
of gas transport to Europe therefore offering them even greater geopolitical control. Russia is 
consequently struggling a lot to ensure that it is not overtaken by events or circumvented by 
other actors in the gas market as far as natural gas supply is concerned. Additionally, Gazprom is 
trying to acquire direct admission to Central Asian gas and has entered into agreements with 
various states to achieve this, putting the proposed Nabucco gas program in danger. 
 
5.2. The South Stream Pipeline Project. 
 
The South Stream pipeline project is an undersea conduit that transports natural gas from 
Bulgaria to Austria and Italy. The pipeline bypasses the Black Sea to Bulgaria. From there, the 
pipeline proceeds in two directions: to Italy through Greece and the Adriatic Sea and to Austria, 
bypassing Serbia and Hungary. This motive for bypassing the Baltic countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe is to reduce Russia’s reliance on their oil terminals. The South Stream pipeline 
was endorsed by the Russian administration and has the support of Italy, Bulgaria, Greece and 
Serbia. Once completed, the South Stream will provide a capacity of 63 bcm per year.
170
  
The South Stream project, however, has not been smooth sailing owing to criticism from 
the EU and the Bush Administration in the US. The EU and the Bush Administration warn that 
                                                          
170 Woehrel Steven, “Russian energy policy toward neighboring countries”, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for 
Congress. 2 September 2011, 19 November 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34261.pdf 
Chapter 5. Competing Pipelines. Consideration of “South Stream” and “Nabucco” as the Main 




the project does not reduce the current overreliance on Russia for natural gas supply. Poland and 
Ukraine oppose the project citing concerns that the South Stream will give Moscow leverage 
over regional energy issues. The Bush Administration opposed the South Stream project, 
proposing that the South and Baltic States should identify alternative gas supplies from Norway 
through Danish pipelines.
171
 Ironically, the Obama Administration has been less critical of the 
project. This could be because the US wants to improve its political relationship with Russia and 
not interfere with its energy issues. However, the administration advocates the revival of the 
Odesa-Brody extension project, which extends the pipeline between Odesa in Ukraine and Brody 
in Poland. The Odesa-Brody project not only reduces Russia’s advantage over Ukraine and 
Brody, but also the overreliance of Russia’s gas supplies to Georgia, Lithuania and Azerbaijan as 
well. 
Despite this opposition, Russia is keen on completing the project. The government has 
not expressed any reservations about the project even after the effect of the global economic 
crisis on declining gas prices. Political and strategic reasons explain this commitment.
172
 Firstly, 
Russia’s stake in the South Stream ensures that it will have decisional control over the project. 
Its 51 percent stake in the pipeline through Gazprom ensures that the county has majority 
ownership of the project. The need for majority ownership arises from the difficulties Russia has 
faced in trying to acquire Urkraine’s pipelines. Again, Russia’s commitment is political because 
it plans to pay higher transit fees for the new pipelines as compared to what Nabucco will pay. 
Analysts estimate that the costs of transporting gas to the new pipelines will surpass the amount 
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that Russia currently incurs through the Ukrainian and Belarus pipelines.
173
 Nevertheless, Russia 
is still willing to push forward with the project, which it anticipates will provide the country with 
sufficient capacity to facilitate gas exports to Europe until 2030.  
Russia’s commitment to the project is strategic because it attempts to prevent the 
construction of the Nabucco pipeline project. Nabucco threat to the South Stream is real on an 
economic and capacity level, given that the former will cost less than half and commence two 
years earlier than the latter.
174
 Consequently, Russia has been implementing competitive 
strategies aimed at halting the construction of Nabucco. The core of these strategies is reduction 
of Nabucco’s supply capacity. Russia can reduce the supply risk from Nabucco by securing 
pipeline connections in Eastern Europe and closing off the Azerbaijan and other terminal links 
for Nabucco. 
The first option for reducing the supply risk is very attractive to Russia. States such 
Azerbaihan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have expressed their interest in the 
Nabucco project. However, Nabucco has no previous knowledge of the market. Russia 
understands the EU market and knows that the contribution from these countries is only 20 
percent of the total gas flow. Since this contribution is quite low, these countries have little 
bargaining leverage for Nabucco and can be easily persuaded to join the South Stream. To 
reduce Nabucco’s gas flows even further, Russia has persuaded Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan to agree with its sales contracts. It has also applied the same strategy to win over 
Turkey from the Nabucco project. Just one month after signing the intergovernmental accord on 
Nabucco, Turkey allowed Russia to use its waters for the South Stream pipeline. This was in 
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exchange for Russia’s infrastructural support for constructing a pipeline from the Black Sea to 
the Mediterranean and expanding the Blue Stream pipeline between the two countries.
175
 As a 
result, these countries have abandoned the Nabucco project, dealing a huge blow for the 
competitor. 
Russia has acquired stakes in different companies to off trading links to Nabucco. The 
first acquisition is the Baumgarten storage and distribution center. This center is the hub of 
Nabucco’s operations and its acquisition by Russia threatens Nabucco’s success. Russia has also 
acquired 50 percent stake in OMV in Austra and a large share in MOL energy firm (Hungary) to 
block Nabucco from proceeding further.
176
 The South Stream project has an advantage over 
Nabucco because Russia still maintains strong political influence over Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan 
and Turkmenistan. This allows Moscow to control the gas flow from the regions. Moreover, 
Russia’s recent assertion that countries bordering the Caspian sea should not build pipelines on 
the sea bed or drill for gas without approval from the neighboring nations restricts Nabucco’s 
arrangement to using tankers to transport oil and gas shipments from the sea to Baku. Thirdly, 
Gazprom’s pricing strategy to pay suppliers the market prices for gas weakens the supplier’s 
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The analysis has shown that the South Stream and the Nabucco projects are the largest 
competitors for the European Union oil and natural gas supply industry. A comparison of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the two projects shows that the South Stream will emerge victorious 
as the EU gas supplier. Although Nabucco has sufficient backing of the EU and the US, the 
project does not have the financial, infrastructural and organizational capacity to counter the 
influence of the South Stream.  This is despite pledges for financial support from the European 
Commission, the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development as well as support from the US. Furthermore, some transit and supplier state 
members to the Nabucco project are still uncommitted and have been persuaded by Russia to 
join the South Stream project. On the other hand, Russia and ENI have the financial, 
infrastructural and organizational capacity to invest in the South Stream pipeline project. 
Russia’s approach to energy policies shows that it will emerge victorious against 
Nabucco. It has undertaken an aggressive campaign to complicate the construction of Nabucco 
by acquiring stakes in transit and supplier countries and using the national support to invest in 
the Central Asian region. This has allowed the country to persuade Nabucco supporters to 
abandon the project, thereby postponing the completion of Nabucco. Moreover, its investments 
in Central Asia enable the country to exploit untapped areas in Siberia and the Far East, thereby 
improving its bargaining advantage over Nabucco. Nabucco’s declining performance has caused 
some European states to migrate to the South Stream project, with calls for Nabucco’s merger 
with the South Stream pipeline. A merger will not achieve Nabucco’s strategy of reducing 
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Russia’s dominance. Nevertheless, the South Stream and Nabucco projects remain competitive 







Russia enjoys the first position as the largest country in the world, however its economic 
capabilities have become very limited and there had been a decline in international position, after 
the cold war ended. The international competition, that takes place in Russia, is of great 
significance, especially in positioning Russia as a world power without using military force. 
Russia wants to be recognized as a powerful state and they want to be in an environment, where 
they do not require much help from their neighbors. The only way of survival for them is to 
employ defensive tactics and hence the need to clearly adopt defensive realism theory. This is 
because other states remain to be threats to Russia and they do not know which among them they 
can contact when they are in trouble. Russia has clearly adopted the approach supported by 
defensive realism theory to regain control as a superpower in Europe.  
The need to apply defensive realism in the Russia’s energy policy has been catalyzed by the 
emerging international competition for the Russia’s energy resources. Russia, as a major supplier 
of gas in the European market, is considered to be quite influential in the energy sector (Jones, 
2009). The Russian government strives to control the energy industry in Russia and the 
neighboring countries in the larger Europe. It is clear that Russia as the state has a strong will to 
gain more political weight through the energy sector. Taking into account, that natural gas is 
hardly replaceable, as it requires a long term investments in transportation infrastructure, its 
consumers have less alternatives, and that fact gives an advantage to supplier in any negotiation 
processes.  
As it was mentioned, there is only one company which manages Russian natural gas export, 
it is Gazprom. But why Gazprom as the independent economic unit, which usually motivated by 





disclosed in Chapter 2, Gazprom is the quasi-gas monopoly, where Government is the main 
shareholder, the shareholder who creates all necessary conditions to strengthen Gazprom’s 
position in both local and overseas markets. It includes granting to Gazprom the status of sole 
gas exporter of natural gas, LNG and LPG, control under UGSS, and primary right to develop 
main gas fields in the country. With support of the Government, Gazprom has also tried to 
squeeze out foreign companies from the Russian domestic market. It succeeded in taking control 
from Shell and BP of the vast Sakhalin-2 project.
178
 In 2009 Gazprom, in spite of expecting 
massive financial losses, cut off all supplies to Europe travelling through Ukrainian pipelines, in 
order to reach political goals of the state. Moreover, it was proven that actual connection 
between Gazprom and the government goes further than the official one, by the fact that current 
political elite in the face of President Dmitri Medvedev and Prime-Minister Vladimir Putin are 
highly associated with the company. Therefore, politicization of Gazprom’s decision-making 
process towards local and overseas markets has enough grounds to be proven.  
 We can conclude that Russia itself acts according to the defensive realism theory that 
justifies the gaining enough power in order to reach certain level of security, while energy sector 
and Gazprom itself are highly politicized. That makes European desire to diversify its gas supply 
sources and decrease dependence on Russia more than justified. However, what are the 
perspectives for Europe to decrease its dependency on Russian natural gas export. 
The most perspective suppliers considered by Europe are other countries in CIS region, 
including Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan – the countries which possess dramatic 
natural gas reserves. But what is the situation on these markets today?  Talking about 
Kazakhstan, we can see that Russia is the main gas consumer here with more than 90 per cent of 
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share in total export. Taking into account strong economic and political relationships between 
Russia and Kazakhstan (newly created custom union, the market price paid by Gazprom for the 
Kazakh’s natural gas, well-established transportation infrastructure), success of Europe in that 
direction is quite miserable. Turkmenistan, Gazprom has major share of this country’s gas 
exports, based on Russian-Turkmen 25-year Cooperation Agreement (2003).
179
  However, the 
Russia-Turkmenistan gas dispute in 2009 made Turkmenistan look for diversification of gas 
consumers. As the result in July 2009, Turkmenistan and Iran signed the agreement to increase 
gas imports, thereby Iran became the second largest Turkmen gas consumer. It is possible, that 
from 2011 onwards, the new player will appear on this market in the face of China, thanks to 
CAGP pipeline. In any case, Turkmenistan has satisfied its desire of gas consumers’ 
diversification, what has filled the market with the demand for now. However, even if these 
countries would have a desire to sell their gas to Europe, the transportation issue arises. The 
unresolved legal status of the Caspian Sea is a stumbling block insofar as Turkmenistan, as well 
as Kazakhstan, feels obliged to take Russia's interests into account in formulating its own energy 
export policy. Russia insists, as a way of blocking the TCGP, that the agreement of all five 
littoral states is necessary for any trans-Caspian pipeline to be built.
180
 The only country, which 
has a real chance to bring its natural gas to Europe, is Azerbaijan. In regard to Azerbaijan, 
Gazprom’s position was quite precarious in the not far past. But already, starting from 2010 
based on the agreement between Gazprom and Socar, the volume of gas planned to be exported 
is 1 Bcm, with a further increase of this figure up to 2 Bcm in 2011. Gazprom currently buys 
Azeri gas at market price and has a strong desire to increase its volume in a short period of time. 
However, Azerbaijan still insists that cooperation with Gazprom won’t affect plans to deliver 
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Azerbaijani gas to the European consumers. In any case, as it was mentioned many times before, 
Gazprom is first of all motivated by political agenda of its host state - preventing Europe to enter 
other potential markets in this case, neither than financial benefits. For this reason money loss is 
acceptable for Gazprom if it causes some “political victory”. Thereby, Russia has price dumping 
advantage over Azerbaijan on European market, when dumping for Azerbaijan is money loss on 
gas which could be sold to Russia for the market price.  
Considering European market itself, we can see that natural gas is currently the second 
most important fuel in the European Union. Europe’s natural gas market shows heavy 
dependence on exporters outside the European Union (EU). Statistics shows, that Europe 
obtained 47 per cent of its natural gas supplies from external sources in 2009.
181
 At present, the 
leading source of natural gas imports to Europe is Gazprom, which exported more than 33 per 
cent of all gas consumed in Europe in 2009. Russia’s expansion strategy aims to increase 
dependence on natural gas to make it the leading exporter of natural gas and dominant political 
power in the EU. As adequacy respond, Europe is actively looking for the alternative which 
includes renewable energy and own shale gas fields development and ambitious Nabucco project 
realization. In the meanwhile, renewable energy has a serious disadvantage such as high cost, 
which makes it low competitive to natural gas. The main difficulty related to shale gas is a fast 
depletion of the gas wells estimated at eight to twelve years compared to the thirty to forty years 
for conventional gas wells.
182
 Nabucco pipeline, as the main competitor of Russian South 
Stream, has faced the lack of contractors. The major contractor is predicted to be Iraq in 
collaboration with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Egypt. Conversely, the Trans-Caspian Pipeline 
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(TCP) plan, which Turkmenistan intends to employ to transport its gas to Azerbaijan, is at the 
preliminary deliberation phase. Bearing in mind the rising gas demand in Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and Turkey, Azerbaijan, besides the reasons described above, will not have sufficient gas in the 
15 years to offer needed capacities to European consumers. When Turkmenistan’s gas 
productivity is constricted to Russia up until 2028 and the likelihood of Iranian gas is far from 
pragmatic, owing to its nuclear agenda. Accordingly, the Nabucco conduit could be unfilled.
183
 
Gazprom, in its turn, doesn’t have any problems with “filling the tube” for its core projects as 
Nord Stream (former names: North Transgas and North European Gas Pipeline) and the South 
Stream pipeline.  
As the main conclusion of this work, we can say that today Europe doesn’t have self-
sufficient alternative to Russian’s natural gas. Unless it is ready to “pay more” for renewable 
energy or depletion of shale gas wells or natural gas which was already bought for the market 
price. However, in long term perspective, by introducing balancing mechanisms to avoid price 
and supply exploitation by companies such as Gazprom by implementing policies for 
competitive supply, incentivizing international companies to invest in gas supply and distribution 
through tax breaks and financial support, and investing in alternative energy industries, Europe 
has real chance to lower its dependency on external suppliers or at least diversify them.   
When this paper was almost finished two remarkable events took place. First, in 
November 2011, after 13 years of planning and two years of construction, the Nord Stream 
pipeline has started to deliver its first supplies of Russian.
184
 Second, in December 2011, Turkey 
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has approved the construction of the South Stream gas pipeline which is intended to carry 





                                                          







     
In the period of globalization, energy security has substantial implications for the mutual 
security of supply and demand. It is dependent on several factors as security of supply, resilience 
and interdependence. As the result, multi-national corporations controlling wide energy 
resources are becoming more and more involved in the international politics - the situation when 
supplier is not just one of the contractual parities but “tool” for political pressure of its host state. 
Russian Gazprom, which operates on European natural gas market, is the vivid example of such 
situation.  
The research project is based on a deep review of relevant literature sources using the data 
analyzing, comparative analysis and the case study methods. The main research questions are the 
following: are European “fears” justified and what are the perspectives for Europe to decrease its 
dependency on Russian natural gas export? The main conclusions to be drawn from this study 
are that Europe has full grounds to be against growing dependence on Gazprom, taking into 
account Gazprom’s involvement into politics, its aggressive actions directed toward prevention 
of Europe accessing other markets, promotion of the projects leading to growth of Europe’s 
dependency on Russian natural gas; and that currently there is no self-sufficient alternative to 
Russian Gas for Europe, unless certain measures will be taken as introducing balancing 
mechanisms to avoid price and supply exploitation by companies such as Gazprom by 
implementing policies for competitive supply, incentivizing international companies to invest in gas 
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Figure 5. A graph of estimated cost curve for gas supply in the EU by 2020  
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Figure 6. The demand for natural gas in the EU in Bcm 
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Figure 7. Global gas resource estimates for 2007/08 
 

























Figure 9. Planed South Stream and Nabucco Gas Pipelines 
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Figure 10. Proved Reserves at end 2009 
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Figure 13. Consumption by Region, Bcm 
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